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The subject that I have chosen to write upon dates
back to the early discoveries and settlements on the American
Continent,

I will not attempt to touch upon the early

English history of the laws of real property however much I
appreciate the importance of its bearing upon the subject before me for it had only been my intention in the space of time
alloted.to discuss the source of tilte to land in this State
and its transfer from the Colonial and State governments .
The original title to land on this continent as between
the different nations of Europe was founded on the international right of discovery and conquests;

this principle was reco"-

nized and followed by all civilized nations at an early day.
The title in order to be a perfect one had to be consummated
by possession and the discovery had to be made by persons
sent out under by those recognizing the government claimed.
The discovery of North America was made under commission from
the English Crown and their first settlerment was made under
a public declaration that they claimed by virtue of their
discovery and settlement possession from the thirty-ninth to

the forty-fifth degrees of latitude.
The invasion of the Dutch of the Island of M4anhattan and
other territory of' the prefsnt state of New York was considered by tlt

English an usurpation of their right and in opposi-

tion to their superior title, founded on prior conquests and
discovery of the coast in general,yet the Dutch patents and
grahts were granted and confirmed by the English authorities.
By letters patent issued in March,1664, by Charles II. to his
brother the Duke of

York his heirs and assigns a large ter-

ritory was granted including the most of the present states
of New York and New Jersey with all the rights,royalties,
profits and all the royal estate, right, title and interest
in free and coranon socage with the power to the Duke to govern according to such laws as the Duke himself might establish or in some cases according to the discretion of his deputies.

These laws were not to be inconsistent with tlB

laws

of England and the right to appeal to the Crown was reserved.
In August, 1673, the Dutch by conquest resumed possession of
the province under th. name of Niew Nederland,

a year later

Holland and England by the treaty of Westminster made peace

with each other and all the possessions of the Dutch on this
continent were ceded to the English.

The territory having

been thus claimed and set up as a British colony the common
law of Ehgland becene the fundamental law of the province;
but it has beon maintained by some jurists that this province
known by the name of New Netherlands as it was held by right
of conquest the conmnon.law of England was rDt immediately
introduced but the former laws and customs of the Dutch continued in force until they were actually changed and new laws
were imposed.

Just what part of the common law of England

was in force here before the American Revolution has been a
subject of considerable doubt and difficulty.
Grants from the Dutch government while they wcrel in possession are held indisputable sources of title.

These grants

were mostly confirmed by new grants or charters from the English government but thWy have been considered good whether
confirmed by the English or riot.

The discovery and actual

settlement of the Lutch has been deemed to have given them
full ownership and sovereignty in spiteof the English claim
of discovery.

The colony under tie

Dutch was governed by a

-4Director General and Council, the former being appointed by
the States General in Holland, and in 1623, the States General made a grant to the Dutch West India Company of all the
The Dutch West India

land situated on Manhattan Island.

Company who upon this grant had coentrl of the settlement
under the sanction and dominion of the home government, in
the year 1'326,

extinguished the Indian title to Manhattan

Island ( now the City and County of New York ) by purchase
from a tribe of aboriginal indians called the Manhattoes for
the sum of sixteen guilders .

The titles under the Dutch

dominion generally emanated from the above company which was
possessed of nost of the powers and functions of a distinct
and separate government, having authority to enact laws, to
establish courts, to adopt forms for administering justice,
to mae treaties with the Indians and to establish a form of
municipal government.

Their grants or "Ground Briefs n as

they were also called ran in the name of the Director General
and Counsellors on behalf of the States General, the Prince
of Orange, and the Managers of the incorporated West India
Company in New Netherlands residing.

They were signed by the

-5Director General and contained conditions of allegiance to
the Dutch government, submission to imposts etc.,.

In the

confirmation of the Dutch grants by tis English the condition
of allegiance to the Dutch government was of course abrogated,
as submission to the English goverrnent was one of the conditions of the surrender of the Dutch in 1664.

Upon the

second surrender to the English by t1r Dutch, Governor Andros,
in his proclamation in 1675 confirmed all prior grants, concessions and estates.

In 1691, under William & Mary by an

Act of the legislative Assembly of tIT

colony of

New York,

for the purpose among other things, of quieting titles, all
charters theretofore granted to cities, municipalities and
others with all royalties and other franchises were confirmed
in very broad terms.

This act was 'alid and was so held

in Brookhaven v. Strong, ,60 N.Y., 56,.

As to its validity

Mr.Angell says inasmuch as the King by virtue of his prerogative was authorized to create political power in this as in
all countries newly discovered and possessed by his subjects,
the colonies on receiving the Royal Charters were invested
with a political character by which they succeeded to all the

-6territorial interests which had previously belonged to the
Sovereign power of the parent country,.

The charters were

in the nature of' grants and conferred Iy the King on the idea
that he was proprietor.

For all purposes of domestic and

internal regulation the colonial legislatures deem themselves
possessed of entire and exclusive authority. Story on the
Constitution, sec. 168.

Thus it is seen that by the English

law the King was the feudal proprietor and source of title to
all land, and in this country before the Revolution tbe

title

to land was derived from the cro,.,vn of England directly or
through colonial governments.
The Act of the State Convention of July 16, 1776, affirmed that all persons residing within this state, and deriving
protection from its laws, owed allegiance to the said laws
and were members of the State.
" A principle is laid down which is believed to be undeniable, the.

the several States whic1

composelthis Union, so

far at least as regarded their municipal regulations, became
entitled, from the time when they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers of sovereign States,

-7and that thy did not derive them from concessions made by the
English King.

The treaty of peace contains a recognition

of their independence, not a grant of it.

From hence it re-

sults that the laws of the several state governments were the
laws of sovereign States and as such were obligatory upon the
people of such state from the time they werc cnacted." IrcIlivaine v. Coxe, 4 Cranch,211.
On October 2,

1779, the legislature of' New York passed

an act declaring all lands, properties, rights, etc. held by
the Crown prior to July 0,1776 were vested in the People of
tlu

State; and by subsequent treaties between the United

States and Geat Britain in 1782-3 and in November 1794,
which followed the Revolution, the right to the soil which
had been previously in Great Britain passed definitely to
these states.

Therefore the actial paramount ownership of

land in this State was vested in the Crown of England previous to the Revolution and in the People of the State afterwards.

Whatever

may have been sometimes practised towrads

the unfortumate aborigines, either -rom humanity or policy,
yet the territory they occupied was disposed of by the governments of Europe at their pleasure as if the country had been

-8found without inhabitants.

After the Revolution the right

of Indian occupancy in this State ind in the various other
States has been in general protected by the political powers
and respected by the courts until extinguished by treaty or
otherwise.

There is a fundamental principle of internation-

al law which prevents titles to land belonging to individuals
from being interfered with upon the establishment of a new
political sovereignty.

It is to this effect that the dis-

memberment or cltange of tID

sovereignty of a nation works no

forfeiture of previously vested right s of property, and that
the cession of a territory by its government passes the sovereignty only and does not interfere with the rights of individuals in property.
Any person claiming title under the new government at
this period however had to show his allegiance by some act at
least of residence otherwise the rights of citizenship were
not acquired.

The rule of citizenship is that if parties

were resident here at the time of the Declaration of Independance although born elsewhere and they freely yielded express
or implied sanction and allegiance to the new government,

t

- they became citizens.
to exist as to all

This right of election has been held

inhabitants of the State and a reasonable
It was even held at

time for its exercise was conceded.

first that if a person was born here and left the country
before the Declaration of Indcyendence a-;d never returned he
had a right of citizenship.

Ainslee v.

1,1artin,

9 M1:lass.,

454.

This principle however was overruled and the more reaonable
an
principle maintained that/antenatus (born before the Union)
never owed allegiance

to the United States if

he had removed

prior to the Declaration of Independence and had not become
redomiciled here prior to the treaty of peace.
Coxe,
in

2 Cranch,

280.

c.Ilvaine v.

The correct doctrine of inheritance

the English law as laid down is

tlat

the right to inherit

depends upon the existing state of atlogiance at the time of
the descent cast.

Hence it follows that the antenati

America may continue to inherit in

of

Great Britain because we

once owed allegiance to that Crown butthe sane reason does
not apply to the antenati of Great Britain because they never
owed allegiance to our government,
Cranch,

321.

In

Dawson v.

Blight v. Rochester,

Godfrey,

7 Wheaton,

535,

4
it

has

-10ben held that persons born out of the United States before
July 4, 1776, or born here and who left this country before
that date and who continued to reside cut of it are aliens
and incapable of taking by descent.
In the Constitution of 1777, and also in the subsequent
Constitutions of 1822 and 1846, it was enacted that all grants
of land in this State granted by the Crown subsequent to
October 14, 1775, are declared null.
firms those
of tle

rants prior to that

date.

This impliedly conIn the sixth articln

Treaty of 1783 with Great Britain it was provided that

there should be no further confiscations or prosecutions by
reason of the part taken by any person in the war;

and

that no person should on that account suffer any future loss
or damage either in his person, liberty or property.

" Thin

treaty only embraces future confiscations and had no retroactive effect". McGregor v. Comstock, 16 Barbour, 427.
case of Brown v.

Sprague,

5 Denio,

545,

The

holds that the above

section of the Treaty not only barred the escheat of land
held by British subjects in this State but gave them capacity
to transmit them by descent, but the descent must be to a

-Ilcitizen.

It

also holds that if

a British subject holding

lands here died previous to the treaty of 1794, leaving no
citizen heirs his lands escheated;

and the provisions of the

Treaty did not pass his lands to alien heirs.
nino

By article

of the Treaty of November 19, 1794 with Great Britain,

it was mutually agreed that British or American subjects
holding land in cach othel"scountries shall continue to hold
them according to the tenure of th(ir respective estates and
titles therein;

and may grant, sell, or devise the same to

whom they please as if

nativos;

and that neither they or

their heirs or assigns as respects said lands and the legal
remedies incident thereto should be regarded as aliens.

'The

parties must show that the titles to the land was in them or
their ancestors at the time the Treaty was made."
Fisher, 1 Wheaton, 300.

Harden v.

"The title of the alien heir would

not prevail if the ancestor died before the Treaty was signed,.
Orser v. Hoag, 3 Hill, 79.

And the case of Orr v.Hodgson,

4 Wheat. 453, holds that the benefits of the treaty would
not be extended to persons who were alien,s to both Great
Britain and the United States.

-12After the Revolution when the people of this State took
under their control the powers of sovereignty all estates,
prerogatives, powers and royalties, which before belonged
either to the Crown or Parliament became immediately vested
in the State.

The rights and powers of the States are con-

sidered established as ,-overeign and their colonial dependence
and legal action. as colonies terminated from the time they
declared themselves independent and not from the date of the
Treaty recognizing their independenc'e.

So it is held that

the laws or grants of the several State governments passed or
executed after the Declaration of Independence were the acts
of sovereign States and as such binding. McIlvainc v. Coxe, 4
Cranch, 209.

The government of this State was organized

and legally begun on the 20th. of April,1777.

As to the

lands that before October 14, 1775, had been legally granted
to individuals by the Crown or to which the title had been
legally acquired by individuals in

any other way neither the

Revolution nor the change of the form of the government nor
the Declaration of the sovereignty of the peoplo worked any
change or forfeiture in the ownership of st.ch property.

-13" Grants made by the Crown subsequent to October 14, 1775,
are declared void. " Constitution of 1777, Title III.
It was, declared by act of' the State in Octobet, 1779,
that the absolute property of all lands, and heriditaments
and of all rents, royalties, franchises, -prerogatives, escheats, forfeitures, debts, dues, duties and services and all
right and title to the same which next and inh.ediately before
the 9th. of July 1776, did vest in or belong or was or were
due to the Crown of Great Britain be the same and each and
every of them are horeiy declared to be and ever since the
said 9th. of July, 177G, to have been and forever hereafter
shall be vested in the people of this State in whom the sove'eignty and sei,-niority thereof are and were united and
vested on and from .:aid 9th. day of July, 1776.
By early enactment and constitutional declaration in
this state, the people of this State in their right of sovereignty are deemed to possess the original and ultimate property in and to all land within the jurisdiction of the State
and all lands the title to which may fail from defect, of
heirs

revert or escheat to the pople, 1 R.3., of 1813.p.380.

-14iThe entire 9roperty of all lands within the state is vested
in the ovner and are declared to be allodial subject to the
liability to escheat to the people and all

feudal tenures

and their incidents are abolished such abolition however not
to discharge rent, or services certain imposed. 1 R.S.p. 718.
Thus it has been seen from the aboVe referenccs that tr.

title

of all lands in this State must have originally emanated from
the existing sovereign power in the State whether through
grants, from the Dutch or English agents by authority from
their home goternment, by charters or letters patent directly
from those governments, or by grant from the people of this
State after the establishment of their sovereignty.

The colony during the colonial rule of the English as a
part of the King's dominions was subject to the control of
the British Parliament; but its more inmediate government was
vested in the Governor and Council appointed by the Crown and
a General Assembly.

The laws of the colony passed by the

provincial legislature under the English sovereig-ty were
passed through the houses of Council and the Assembly subject

-15to the Governor's veto and approval by the King.

The com-

missiois to the different governors gave them power to make
laws and ordinances for the peace and -,ood government of
the p rovince,
sembly;

by and with the consent of the Council and As-

said laws were not to be repugnatt to the laws or

statutes of Great Britain.

Within three months after

making they were to be transmitted to the King for approval.
If

the laws were disapproved by the King and the disapproval

was signified to the Governor then and frori thenceforthothe
law was to be void.

The colonial statutes therefore had

the force of laws without the expressed approval of the home
government, and until they were anulled ad disapproved.

The

power of assenting to or withholding assent to colonial
statutes were conferred on the Governors.

If approved by

them they were to be transmitted to the home government for
examination with the proviso how ,ver that they were to be
valid and binding until disapproved and rejected by the Crovm,
smith History of New York, pp. 102,353.

By the royal com-

missions to Governors the Governor with the advice of his
Council was authorized to make grants of the public lands on

-16such terms as might be demed proper, whici. grants on being
scaled with the colonial seal and recorded were to be effectual.

The grants of colonial Governors before the Revolu-

tion have always been takcnn as conclusive evidence of authority t6 dispose of public lands.

Vrhere the authority is exer-

cised without any evidence of disavowal, revocation or denial
by the Crown its consequent acquiescence and presumed r-tification are proof in the absence of any proof to the contrary
of the

Crown's assent to the acts of the Governors.

is never required to show that

Proof

there exists authority in the

officers who exercise it in -aking grants for it is considerel
that it is fully evidenced by occupation, enjoyment and transfer of property had and rndfde under the grants without disturbance by any superior power and respected by all officers
where it lies.

And it was laid down in the case of the

People v.Trinity Church, 22 N.Y., 144, that where a,-rant wms
and
made/an action done and titles have vested under any act ad
interim and before it was annulled by the Crown they would
not be void or become divested in consequence of the subsequent disapproval of the Crown.

An act was passed in May,

-171691, by the Governor and Assembly confirming all prior patents, charters and grants to bodies and individuals in the
Colonies under prior Kings and notwithstanding deficiencies
of form and nonfeasance.

Saving rights to be asserted in

five years and rights of infants, lunatics, and married women.

" A State has the right to dispose of unappropraiated land
within its own limits and when a grant has been made t1v
title becomes vested, without any power in the state to rescind the Srant for fraud or otherwise, when the land granted
has :2assed into the hands of the bonafide purchaser for value
without notice;

nor without fraud can it be revoked at all

if its conditions are performed" Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch,
87.

The land, or property of the State is

ferred by charter or by letters patent;

usually trans-

a grant however may

be made by a law and a confirmation by a law is as fully a
grant as if it contained a grant in terms. 2 VWheat.,

196.

"The lack of the Governor's signatuIr on a patent does not invalidate the instrument.

It is the great seal which authen-

ticates the patent, and the fact of the seal being attached

-18is prima facie ovidence that the patent was approved by the
Governor and issued by his direction."
8 Barbour, 253.

"

People v. Livingstone,

A patent takes effect from the time it

is approved by the land office and passes the office of the
Secretary of State.

Its date is not conclusive."

Douglass, 5 Cowen, 458.

"

Jackson v.

Where the State makes a grant of

property to which it has no title the grant is void.

State

grants are not considered as warranties and no estate would
pass to the grantee except what was at the time in the State.
Nor can a State constitutionally affirm a void patent so as
to divest the title legally acquired before the attempted
confirmation."

10 Peters,662.

"

A patent issued by the

State conveying its own lands, will be presumed to have been
issued regularly and that all preliminary requisites have
been complied with;

and if it be not void on its face can-

not be avoided collaterally in a suit between individuals."
Brady v. Begun, 36 Barbour, 5.3.

Objections showing that

the patent was issued without authority, or was absolutely
void from the beginning or prohibited by law would be considered.

In a collateral action it cannot be assailed for any

-10other cause.

The Constitution in stating that the people

are deemed to possess the original and ultimate property in
all lands does not set up the legal presumption of title in
favor of the people against the actual occupant of the land
until it is shown that the possession has been vacant within
forty years.

if the premises are vacant the legal pre-

sumption is that the people are owners.

The possession

itself presumes a grant from the sovereign power of what was
once the State's. Wendall v. Jackson, 8 Wendall, 183.
the Ccde of Civil Procedure of New York, section 362,

By
The

"

people of the State will not sue any person with respect to
real property unless their right has accrued within forty
years, nor unless they or those under whom they claim, shall
have received some rents thereof within forty years."

If

there be an omission or failure to comply with the conditions of a grant from the State no one but the State can
take advantage of it."

Williams v. Sheldon, 10 Wend., 654.

The Code of Civil Procedure section 1957, provides that an
action may be brought by the Attorney General to vacate letters patent from the State where there has been fraud or

-20concealment or mistake or ignorance of facts;

or where there

has been a forfeiture of the patentee's interest by noncompliance with the terms or conditions thereof or otherwise.
" These proceedings brought to forfeit and vacate letters
patent are held to be applicable only to letters patent
granted by the People of the State and do not extend to letters patent granted by the Englich Crown before the Revolution."

The People v. Clark, 10 Barber, 120.

The deeds

and instruments of the State are made out by a public officer
in behalf of the State although the officer is naerly a nominal party.

The letters patent from the State granting

lands may be recorded in the county where the lands are situated in the same manner and with like effect as are deeds
when duly acknowledged.

The Constitution of 184C, Article I.

section 9, requires the assent of two-thirds of the members
elected to each uranch of the Jegislature to every bill appropriating public property for local or private purposes.
Under the consideration of grants from the State we may
look for a moment at the subject of franchises.

Franchises

are privileges or immunities of a public n~tIre conferred

-21generally by grant or action of the legislature;

these

rights it is held cannot be extended by implication and are
not the subjects of assignment or transfer.

The general

understanding of the grant of a franchise is that there is
an implied cevenant on the part of a government not to disturb or invade the rights vested;

and on the part of the

grantees to carry out the conditions and duties prescribed
in the grant.

It has been held tha

the government cannot

resume them at pleasure or interfere with a franchise so as
to impair its value materially or grant a competing franchise
without a breach of contract.

Thus where the legislature

by act grants a franchise no right of repeal is reserved and
a subsequent act repealing the first has been held unIonstitutional as impairing the obligation of a contract.

College v. Woodward,
injunction in equity,

4 Vrneat.,

518.

Dartmouth

The remedy would be bv

The general rule however has under-

gone modifications as has been required from time totime. to
suit
/public

demands or necessity as in the cees of roads, ferrys

and bridges, particularly those in the vicinity of large
towns.

And by more recent decisions in this State it has been

-22hold that the legislature by the grant of one franchise is
not restrained by

ay implication from the creation of another

whore public convenience or necessuty so requires.

A still

later decision extended this doctrine further and held nothing
passes under a franchise against the Stcte by implication
and that franchises must be c nstrued. according to their
terms. Auburn etc.R.R.Co. v. Douglass, 5 Seldon,444.

The

courts have held however that if a com-npany receive an exclusive privilege within a locality specified for the exercise of
its franchise, it is a contract on the part of the State and
inviolable.

It is otherwise if the privilege is not speci-

fied as exclusive. Binghampton Bridge, . Wallace,51.

But

the doctrine as hold in the above case has been made void.
In New York by a Constitutional armndment passed in 1874, in
which the legislature is prohibited from granting to any
private corporation association or individual any exclusive
privilege,immunity or franchise whatever.

a Where a contract

has been made by a State it is laid down as arule that if the
contract when made is valid by the Constitution and laws of
the State as there expounded by the Ilighest authorities whose

-23duty it was to administer them, no subsequent act by the
legislature or judiciary can impair its obligation." Gelpcke
v. The City of Dubuque, 1 Wallace,175.
Tho, rights of the public are considered superior to
those of the State where an encroachment is authorized or a
nuisance takes place, for example where there is an abridgement of the common right of navigation.

Under the Consti-

tution of the United States the proprietary right of the ;
State and its granteos is subject to the authority of Congress over navigation and navigable waters and in a case where
the State authorizc encroachments, on the conmon water highway there would be a remedy in the United States Courts in
behalf of the public against the official bodies or others
and for abatement of an undue encraochment as a nusiance.
This is in the nature of a restriction on the State power.
But i

the absence of legislation by Congress a State statute

which authorizes the erection of a darn in a navigable river
which is wholly within the State limits is not unconstitutional.

People v. N.Y.etc. Co., 68 N.Y., 71.

The legislature

of the State may also in the absence of restraint by a Con-

-24ressional legislation authorize the erection of a bridge over
its navigable waters, subject to any prohibition by Congress
or direction as to what facilities may be afforded for the
navigation of the river.

" Offending bridges or other ob-

structions over navigable waters may be enjoined or removed
by judicial action." People v. Tibbetts, 19 N.Y.,

523.

But an

act of Congress that declares a bridge a lawful structure
legalizes it and it cannot be removed as obstructing navigation. Gray v. Chicago R.R. 2 Woolw. 63.

By the Constitu-

tion of the Unitod States Congress is invested with the power
of disposing of the public lands belonging to the United
States and of making such rules as may be required as regarding their regulation, and a State has no power over such
public lands within its limits.

Title passes from the

United States under authority of an act of Congress by means
of letters patent accompanied with sufficient description or
survey.
Thus the general features of the history of the source of
title to land in this State and its transfer from colonial to
State authorities, I believe, in the -lain havebeen presented.

- '5With a history of this nature wherein so many matters of.
importance are reviewed it has been almsot impossible to
treat them exhaustively and if I have discussed the most
important matters that might arise under this subject with
some degree of clearness and historical order, I have at
least partially accomplished what I set opat to do.
/7

